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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the 
Supreme Court by U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(i). The case under appeal 
was a probate action. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
2. The issues presented for review includes 
I* Whether the spouse's Exempt Property claim 
brought pursuant to U.C.A. §75-2-402 is a 
"statutory allowance11 as that term is used in 
U.C.A. §75-6-107 such that any deficiency would be 
payable from the multiple-party accounts of the 
deceased. 
II* Whether certain personal property, 
referred to as the R.C. Willey furniture, which was 
purchased by the deceased shortly before his 
marriage to the surviving spouse, and in 
anticipation of the marriager and which was jointly 
possessed and used by the deceased and his 
surviving spouse during the marriage was properly 
included and ruled to be solely the property of the 
Estate or whether the surviving spouse had some 
ownership interest therein either as a Tenant by 
the Entireties or as a Tenant in Common. 
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Ill* If the R.C. Willey Furniture was properly 
held to be solely an asset of the Estate, then 
whether it should have been valued as of the date 
of death and as used property rather than at the 
full cost of its purchase as new property* 
Appellant maintaining that the correct value should 
have been its value as used furniture at the time 
of death and not its full purchase price as new 
property ten days previous. 
IV* Whether certain other miscellaneous 
personal property of the Estate should have been 
valued by the Court at its appraised value, in the 
absence of a valid objection thereto, or whether 
the Court, Sua Sponter properly ordered a new 
appraisal of the furniture by a specific 
individual. 
V. Whether funds obtained from the 
multiple-party accounts of the deceased for payment 
of claims against the Estate should have been 
administered by the Personal Representative as a 
part of the Estate in accordance with U.C.A. 
§75-6-107, rather than being paid directly to 
claimants by the other multiple-party account 
holder. 
VI. Whether payments ordered to be paid to the 
Personal Representative from the multiple-party 
accounts of the deceased should have included an 
award of interest. 
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STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
The interpretation of the following Statutes is believed 
to be determinative of the issues under appeal: 
§75-2-402, U.C.A.,(1953) as amended 1975 
Exempt Property: 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the 
surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in 
this state is entitled from the estate to value not 
exceeding $3,500 in excess of any security 
interests therein in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal 
effects. If there is no surviving spouse, 
children of the decedent are entitled jointly to 
the same value. If encumbered chattels are 
selected and if the value in excess of security 
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is 
less than $3,500, or if there is not $3,500 worth 
of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or 
children are entitled to other assets of the 
estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up 
the $3,500 value. Rights to exempt property and 
assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt 
property have priority over all claims against the 
estate, except reasonable funeral expenses, and the 
right to any assets to make up a deficiency of 
exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit 
prior payment of the reasonable funeral expenses, 
homestead allowance, and family allowance. These 
rights are in addition to any benefit or share 
passing to the surviving spouse or children by the 
will of the decedent unless otherwise provided, by 
intestate succession, or by way of elective share. 
§75-3-706, U.C.A., (1953) as amended 1975 
Employment of Appraisers: 
The personal representative may employ a 
qualified and disinterested appraiser to assist him 
in ascertaining the fair market value as of the 
date of the decedent's death of any asset the value 
of which may be subject to reasonable doubt. 
Different persons may be employed to appraise 
different kinds of assets included in the estate. 
The names and addresses of any appraiser shall be 
indicated on the inventory with the item or items 
he appraised. 
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§75-6-107, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 1975 
Rights of Creditors: 
No multiple-party account will be effective 
against an estate of a deceased party to transfer 
to a survivor sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and 
expenses of administration, including statutory 
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children 
and dependent children, if other assets of the 
estate are insufficient. A surviving party, P.O.D. 
payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from a 
multiple party account after the death of a 
deceased party shall be liable to account to his 
personal representative for amounts the decedent 
owned beneficially immediately before his death to 
the extent necessary to discharge the claims and 
charges mentioned above remaining unpaid after 
application of decedent's estate. No proceeding to 
assert this liability shall be commenced unless the 
personal representative has received a written 
demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one 
acting for a minor or dependent child of the 
decedent; and no proceeding shall be commenced 
later than two years following the death of the 
decedent. Sums recovered by the personal 
representtive shall be administered as part of the 
decedent's estate. This section shall not affect 
the right of a financial institution to make 
payment on multiple-party accounts according to the 
terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a 
deceased party unless before payment the 
institution has been served with process in a 
proceeding by the personal representative.(1975) 
(Editorial Board Comments are provided in the 
Addendum to this Brief.) 
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Rule 706, Utah Rules of Evidence 
COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS 
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own 
motion or on the motion of any party enter an order 
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be 
appointed, and may request the parties to submit 
nominations• The court may appoint any expert 
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may 
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An 
expert witness shall not be appointed by the court 
unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed 
shall be informed of his duties by the court in 
writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the 
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties 
shall have opportunity to participate. A witness 
so appointed shall advise the parties of his 
findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by 
any party; and he may be called to testify by the 
court or any party. He shall be subject to 
cross-examination by each party, including a party 
calling him as a witness. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Personal Representative of her deceased husbands Estate 
appeals various rulings of the District Court related to the 
Probate of the Estate. 
The rulings under appeal were made after a half day trial, 
held April 10, 1987 before the Court on the Objections to 
Inventory and Accounting filed by the Respondent, Sharon Beers, 
a daughter of the decedent. A transcript of these proceedings 
are a part of the record in this appeal and reference thereto 
are to page number and line, and in the following form: (TR: pg 
xx, In xx). 
The court made its findings and rulings from the bench, 
which are found verbatim in the transcript at pages 93-102. 
These findings and rulings were submitted to the court as 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and were signed 
by the Court June 22r 1987. (Pages 172-177 of the Record) This 
is the ruling which is being appealed and a copy is provided in 
the Addendum to this brief. 
Other issues related to the Probate of this Estate were 
resolved by Order of the same Court made some 14 months 
previous, and after a hearing held February 14, 1986. None of 
the rulings made at that time were appealed, but a transcript 
of that proceeding is a part of the record as well as the 
Court's Memorandum Decision and the resulting Order on the 
6 
issues presented at that time. (R 44-47). 
Pages 124-148 of the record contain Respondents, "VERIFIED 
OBJECTIONS TO: (1) INVENTORYr (2) SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT AND 
DISTRIBUTION (3) PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS AND ORDER 
ALLOWING CLAIMS AND (4) MOTION FOR ORDER OF PAYMENT FROM JOINT 
ACCOUNT OF THE DECEASED.11 It is referred to in this brief as 
simply "Respondents Objections". The Personal Representative's 
"REPLY TO OBJECTIONS", which was incorporated into counsels 
closing argument by reference thereto (TR 93, lines 2 -6) is 
also a part of the record (R 152-164) and is referred to in 
this brief as "REPLY TO OBJECTIONS". 
The issues under appeal involve the interpretation of 
various provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, especially 
U.C.A. §75-6-107, as well as questions of ownership and 
valuation of certain items of personal property held to be a 
part of the estate, and related questions of probate law. 
FACTS 
The deceased, Allan Hamilton Wagley, married Susan Wagley 
on November 25, 1985. (R 173, HI) Both were of legal age and 
no question of the competency of either party has been raised. 
On November 20, 1985, five days prior to this, his most 
recent marriage, the Decedent purchased from R.C. Willeys 
furniture store certain items of household furniture consisting 
of a refrigertor, bedroom set, and two chairs at a total cost 
of $2,558.00 (R 173, 13). This furniture, which is referred to 
as the R.C. Willey furniture, was delivered to his new home 
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after his marriage (TR: pg 12, In 1) • The furniture was 
purchased in anticipation of marriage (TR: pg 12, In 1) and was 
jointly possessed and used by the deceased and his new wife 
during their brief marriage. (TR: pg 9, In 1-25; pg 10, In 1; 
Pg 57 In 15; Pg 67, In 21-29; Pg 68, In 1-5; Pg 94, In 12-19) 
The deceased also brought other miscellaneous personal property 
to the marriage. (R 174, 16) 
Prior to the marriage, the deceased also established joint 
accounts with his daughter, Sharon Beers, the Respondent 
herein. These accounts consisted of approximately $18,000.00, 
all of which was contributed by the deceased and which 
constituted virtually his entire Estate. (R 173, K2) 
On November 30, 1985, five days after his marriage to the 
Appellant, the deceased died of a heart attack. (R 173, 11) 
The surviving spouse was appointed Personal Representative of 
the Estate, and the decedents will was admitted to Supervised 
Probate. The terms of the will proved to be immaterial, 
however, because the assets of the Estate were insufficient to 
pay the debts of the deceased, Administrative expenses and 
Statutory Allowances to the surviving spouse. (R 175, 116&18) 
Because of the insufficiency of the Estate, and pursuant to 
D.C.A. §75-6-107, the Court permitted invasion of the 
multiple-party accounts held jointly by the deceased and the 
Respondent in order to make up the deficiency necessary to pay 
the Court awarded family allowance, the debts of the decedent, 
his burial expenses and the costs of administration, (R 176, 
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13). The court refused to allow the joint accounts to be 
invaded for the purpose of paying the deficiency in the 
surviving spouse's exempt property claim brought pursuant to 
U.C.A. §75-2-402. (R 176, f4) 
The surviving spouse claimed ownership of the R.C. Willey 
furniture as a surviving joint owner. (R 154) (TR: pg 93f In 
2-6) However, the court upheld the Respondent's Objection 
thereto and ruled that this property was solely an asset of the 
Estate and that its fair market value was equal to its purchase 
price as new property. (R 173, 13&5) 
The Personal Representative claimed no ownership interest 
in the other miscellaneous personal property and it was listed 
on the original Inventory as Estate property. (R 116-117) She 
obtained an appraisal of this property and no objection to the 
appraisal was filed. (TR: pg 99, In 24-25; pg 100, In 1-25; pg 
101, In 1), and in fact, the parties below agreed to the value 
of the property (R 127, 17). 
The court refused to accept the appraisal, however, and 
instead, sua sponte, ordered a new appraisal be obtained from a 
specific named individual, (R 174, U6) and at the same time, 
ruled that the new appraisal would be determinative as to the 
fair market value of the property if the Respondent desired to 
purchase it, and otherwise, that it was to be sold and valued 
at its sales price. (TRt pg 96, In 12-19) (R 174, 16). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The District Court ruled that multiple-party accounts of 
the deceased were not available to make up the deficiency in 
estate assets needed to satisfy the spouse's exempt property 
claim. Appellant maintains this ruling constitutes plain error 
based on the clear language of the relevant provisions of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code and the Editorial Board Comments 
thereto. 
II. The District Court ruled that certain items of 
household furniture (referred to as the R.C. Willey Furniture) 
purchased by the deceased were solely assets of the estate. 
Appellant submits that the evidence shows the property was 
acquired in contemplation of marriage and was jointly possessed 
and used by the parties during the brief marriage. Therefore, 
the surviving spouse enjoyed an ownership interest in the 
property, either; (1) solely as a surviving joint owner by the 
entireties; or (2) as a one-half owner with the estate as a 
tennant in common. 
III. The Trial Court set the value of the R.C. Willey 
furniture at its full cost of purchase which occurred ten days 
before decedent's death. Appellant maintains that property of 
an Estate must be valued as of the date of death. Appellant 
further maintains that in the absense of any other evidence as 
to value, the Personal Representatives estimate of value is 
conclusive. 
IV. With regard to other miscellaneous personal property 
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of the Estate, the Trial Court refused to recognize what was, 
in essence, a stipulation between the parties with regard to 
value, and for some unstated reason, ordered a new appraisal of 
the property by a specific named individual. Appellant 
maintains that this was an abuse of the Courts discretion, and 
that the value of the property should have been as set forth by 
the first appraisal because that was the only evidence offered 
as to value. 
V. The relevant statute allowing the invasion of multiple-
party accounts of the deceased to pay certain basic expenses of 
the estate provides that these funds shall be administered as 
part of the decedentfs Estate. The court refused to so order 
in this case, thereby complicating the Probate of the Estate 
and causing confusion on the part of the creditors with regard 
to who was responsible for payment of claims. Appellant argues 
that the plain language of the statute requires that sums 
recovered from the multiple-party accounts be administered by 
the Decedent's Estate* 
VI. Finally, Appellant maintains that amounts ordered to 
be paid to the Personal Representative from the multiple-party 
accounts of the deceased should have included an award of 
interest. This result is dictated by relevant provisions of 
the Utah Code which provide for the award of interest at the 
legal rate; or, as a matter of equity, under a theory of 
quantum meriut, and in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the 




THE MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS OF THE DECEASED SHOULD 
BE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY ANY DEFICIENCY IN THE 
EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM OF THE SPOUSE. 
Under the Utah Uniform Probate Codef the surviving spouse 
of a decedent is entitled to claim from the estate, $3,500.00 
worth of exempt property in the form of household furniturer 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal effects. 
(U.C.A. S75-2-402). If there is not $3,500.00 worth of exempt 
property in the estate, the spouse is entitled to other assets 
of the Estate to the extent necessary to make up the deficiency 
(Id)* The statute further provides that; 
"...Rights to exempt property and assets needed to 
make up a deficiency of exempt property have 
priority over all claims against the estate, except 
reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any 
assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt 
property shall abate as necessary to permit prior 
payment of the reasonable funeral expenses, 
homestead allowance, and family allowance..." 
(U.C.A. S75-2-402) 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code also provides that; 
"No multiple-party account will be effective 
against an estate of a deceased party to transfer 
to a survivor sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and 
expenses of -administration including statutory 
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children 
and dependent children, if other assets of the 
estate are insufficient-,..11 (U.CA. S75-6-107) 
In this casef the District Court ruled that the surviving 
spouse may claim exempt property jap to $3,500.00 in property of 
the estate but defined the Estate to exclude the multiple party 
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accounts. The District Court specifically ruled that proceeds 
of the multiple-party account of the decased and his daughter 
were not available to satisfy the deficiency in the exempt 
property claim of the widow. (R 176, 14) 
This is contrary to the plain language of the statute which 
specifically includes, "statutory allowances to the surviving 
spouse". (O.C.A. §75-6-107). For the District Court ruling to 
be correct, the term "statutory allowances" must be read to 
exclude the surviving spouse's exempt property allowance. 
The Editorial Board Comment to O.C.A. §75-6-107 
specifically states: "The phrase 'statutory allowances' 
includes the homestead allowance under §75-2-401, the family 
allowance under §75-2-403, and any allowance needed to make up 
the deficiency in exempt property under §75-2-402." (emphasis 
added). (See Addendum for full Text)^ Likewise, the Official 
Comments to the Model Uniform Probate Code also define the 
phrase "statutory allowances" to include any allowance needed 
to make up the deficiency in exempt property under Section 
2-402. (Model Uniform Probate Code - Comment, Section 
6-107)(See Addendum for full text). Therefore, it would seem 
that the District Courts ruling on this point constitutes plain 
error. 
While no cases have been found construing U.C.A. §75-6-107, 
that is not surprising in view of the clear language of the 
statute and the availability of the Official Comments to define 
"statutory allowances". Certainly there are no cases or other 
13 
indication that the legislature intended any result other than 
that provided in the Official Comment and the plain language of 
the statute. 
The importance of this statute is especially apparent in 
this case. There is nothing for the omitted spouse to claim 
under U.C.A. S75-2-301. Similarly, because of the 
peculiarities of the Utah Law# the augmented Estate (U.C.A. 
§75-2-202) offers absolutely no protection to this surviving 
spouse. (See, 1976 Utah Law Review 771 at 807-812) 
POINT II 
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN 
THE HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND FURNISHINGS REFERRED TO AS 
THE R.C. WILLEY FURNITURE, EITHER AS A TENANT BY 
THE ENTIRETIES OR AS A TENANT IN COMMON. 
The R.C. Willey furniture was purchased by the deceased in 
anticipation of marriage and for the use of both parties to the 
marriage. (TR: pg 94f In 12-19). And it was jointly possessed 
by them during their brief marriage. (TR: pg 11, In 25; pg 12, 
In 1) The surviving spouse claimed an ownership interest in 
the R.C. Willey furniture as a surviving joint owner. (R 154) 
(TR: pg 93, In 2-7). Alternative forms of ownership would 
include: (1) Sole ownership as the surviving owner as a Tenant 
by the Entireties, or; (2) One-half owner with the Estate as a 
Tenant in Common. 
The District Court, however, while recognizing that the 
R*C. Willey furniture was part of the marital estate, (TR: pg 
14 
94, In 12-19), nonetheless refused to recognize an ownership 
interest in the spouse and instead ruled that the property was 
solely an asset of the estate (R 173, 15) (TR: pg 94, In 
12-19). 
The law regarding ownership of personal property in the 
joint possession of husband and wife is, to say the least, 
unsettled. See, Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights between 
Husband and Wife in Personal Property: Part I, 52 Mich Law Rev. 
779 (1954); and Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights between 
Husband and Wife in Personal Property: Part II, 52 Mich Law 
Rev. 957 (1954). Not surprisingly, the thrust of Professor 
Townsend's article involves the question of whether the joint 
ownership of personal property between husband and wife is by 
Tenants in the Entirety or as Tenants in Common, which seems to 
assume joint rather than sole ownership. While the scope of 
Professor Townsend1s article is quite broad, the issue in. the 
case at hand is far less complex because it involves only the 
question of the ownership interest in household goods and 
furnishings acquired in contemplation of, or after marriage, 
and for use by the family* 
Most of the courts that have considered this specific 
question, at least in modern times, have resolved the question 
clearly in favor of joint ownership. For the most part, this 
has been accomplished through application of the doctrine of 
ownership by the entirety. (See, e.g. Faulk v. Estate of 
Haskins, 714 P*2d 354 (Alaska, 1986); DuPont v. DuPont, 33 
15 
Del.Ch 571, 98 A.2d 493, (1953); Hagin v. Haqin, 353 So.2d 949 
(Pla.App.1978); Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772 
(1978); DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 
(1975). (See also, 64 ALR2d 8 §28, and later case service for 
cases cited therein). 
Courts that have rejected the doctrine of tenancy by the 
entireties with regard to household goods and furnishings, 
either because of statute or otherwise, have generally held 
that joint ownership by husband and wife of such personal 
property is ordinarly as Tenants in Common. (Panushka v. 
Panushka, 349 P.2d 450, 221 Or. 145 (1960), and cases cited; 
Remington v. Landolt, 541 P.2d 472, 273 Or. 297.(1975). 
Whether tenancy by the entirety in personal property is a 
viable principle of Utah Law, seems to be an open question. 
Professor Townsend expresses the opinion that while no longer 
applicable to an interest in real estate, the Utah legislature 
has inferred that it still exists with respect to 
personal property. (52 Mich. Law Rev. note 76 at 797). It is 
unclear whether Professor Townsend is relying on the 
legislative intent expressed in U.C.A. §57-1-5, or otherwise. 
It is clear, however, that the concept of tenancy by the 
entirety is at least noted in U.C.A. §78-41-1. 
The cases collected by Professor Townsend that have 
resolved the issue of tenancy by the entirety as related to 
personal property, do little to clarify the question. (52 Mich 
Law Rev. note 79 at 797) 
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In the recent cause of Gorrell v. Gorrellf 62 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30 (Ct. App. 1987) (semble) The Utah Court of Appeals had 
occasion to consider the ownership of a cash asset as between a 
decedent and her surviving spouse. In that case, the trial 
Court ruled that a cash asset found in the house, the existance 
which had been previously unknown to the surviving spouse, was 
solely an asset of the deceased wife's Estate. The Court of 
Appeals reversed and held that it was error to impose on the 
surviving spouse the burden of proving ownership. 
It seems clear that the Court of Appeals found the asset in 
Gorrell to be the sole property of the surviving spouse rather 
than belonging equally to the surviving spouse and the estate 
of the deceased as Tenants in Common. It is unclear, however, 
whether the Court reached this result because it believed the 
hidden asset belonged solely to the surviving spouse before the 
death of his wife, or whether it became his sole property upon 
her death by the doctrine of Tenancy by the Entirites or some 
other unstated legal theory. 
Unlike the case under appeal here, in Gorrell the parties 
had been married for over 22 years. However, there is no 
statute nor any cases that purport to determine property 
ownership between a decedent and a surviving spouse based on 
the length of their marriage. On final analysis, the decision 
in Gorrell seems to support appellant's arguement in this case, 
but it does not seem to provide applicable reasoning. 
In 1986, the Alaska Supreme Court had occasion to consider 
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the question of the ownership interest of a surviving spouse in 
personal property which had been jointly used and possessed by 
the spouse and the decedant. Faulk v. Estate of Haskins, 714 
P.2d 354 (Alaska 1986). In Faulk, the facts of which are very 
similar to the case at barf the Alaska Court concluded quite 
simply that household goods and furnishings which a husband and 
wife jointly possess and use is presumed to be held in tenancy 
by the entirety. 
While the Alaska Supreme Court had the benefit of a statute 
which seemed to affirm the existance of tenancy by the entirety 
in Alaska, at least with respect to personal property, (AS 
34.15.130) they specifically relied upon the reasoning for the 
presumption as set forth by the Delaware Chancelors Court in 
DuPont v. DuPont, 98 A.2d 493, 33 Del. Ch. 571 (1953). In the 
DuPont case, a particularly well written and well reasoned 
decision, the court stated: 
"I conclude that household goods and furnishings, 
even though contributed or paid for by the husband, 
are presumptively held jointly-by the 
entireties-when such property is in the joint 
possession and use...I reach this conclusion for 
several reasons. First, under present day 
conditions, there is no longer any compelling 
reason to conclude that property so intimately 
associated with the marriage relationship should be 
considered as presumptively belonging to either-
one. Each spouse in his or her own way contributes 
to the accumulation of such property...11 
*If married couples desire to preserve individual 
title to such property, it is up to them to 
evidence such ownership by appropriate documents or 
by other evidence which can overturn the 
presumption of joint ownership. I believe the 
presumption that they hold such property by the 
entirety is not only fair under the circumstances 
but almost legally necessary to avoid an accounting 
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in every such case. Moreover, the difficulties of 
tracing title over a period of time would render 
the problem almost legally insurmountable. I point 
out that my decision is confined to the question of 
title as between husband and wife to houshold goods 
and furnishings held and used as here stated." 
Similiar reasoning led the Pennsylvania Superior Court to 
conclude that a truck held in the husbands name alone was 
entireties1 property where the truck had been used for the 
benefit of the marriagef with access to use equally permitted 
wife and husband, despite the fact that another truck which had 
been traded to purchase the truck in question had been titled 
in the husbands name alone. Simon v. Simon, 429 A.2d 1, 286 
Pa. Super 403 (1981) 
Likewise, most courts that have considered the issue have 
concluded that the mere fact that the funds used for the 
purchase belonged to one or the other of the spouses does not 
result in the furnishings in question being owned solely by 
that spouse. This principal was expressed most clearly by the 
Maryland Supreme Court in Bender v. Bender, 386 A.2d 772, 282 
Md 525 (1978), which responded to the question as follows: 
"We today conclude that in the case of household 
goods and furnishings acquired for the use of the 
family in contemplation of or after marriage, the 
mere fact that the funds used for the purchase 
belonged to one or the other of the spouses does 
not result in the furnishing in question being 
owned solely by that spouse. It is to be presumed 
in such a case that the purchasing spouse made a 
gift of the property to the marital unit, creating 
ownership by the entireties in the husband and 
wife..." (Id at 778-779) 
In its decision, the Bender Court relied upon the 
reasoning set forth by the Pennsylvania Court in the landmark 
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case of DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 459 Pa. 641. In 
that case, the household goods and furnishings were admittedly 
purchased with decedents funds. Nevertheless, both spouses 
selected the various items together, intended the items be 
mutually used, and in fact, shared in such item's use and 
possession. Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that 
both parties intended to donate the household goods and 
furnishings to the "marital unit" and concluded that the 
household items belonged to both parties, but, as tenants in 
common. Id at 17815]. 
The DiFlorido trial court, in order to ascertain the 
ownership of these household items, traced the source of funds 
used in purchasing the contested property and then, presuming 
the purchaser to be the owner, placed the burden on the other 
party to show that a gift to the marital unit had been made. 
(Id at 178 T5]K 
The appeals court rejected that reasoning as follows: 
*...[W]e cannot accept an approach that would base ownership of 
household items on proof of funding alone, since to do so would 
necessitate an itemized accounting whenever a dispute over 
household goods arose..." 
The DeFlorido Court then held: 
"We conclude, therefore, that for the purpose of 
determining title of household goods and 
furnishings between husband and wife, the property 
that has been acquired in anticipation of or during 
marriage, and which has been possessed and used by 
both spouses, will, in the absence of evidence 
showing otherwise, be presumed to be held jointly 
by the entirety." (Id at 180)(emphasis added) 
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The opposite result was reached in the case of In re: 
Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479 (Bkrtcy 1985). In this fascinating 
decision, the Bankruptcy Court was called upon to interpret 
Wyoming Law with regard to the ownership of household goods and 
furnishings in the possesion of married persons. The court 
concluded that Wyoming was among the minority of states 
recognizing tenancy by the entirety in personal property. The 
Court then entered into a detailed and technically appealing 
analysis of the requirements of tenancy by the entirety under 
the common law as interpreted by the Wyoming Courts. (Id 
485-487) 
Based on this anaylsis, the Anselmi Court characterized 
household goods and artwork possessed by the debtor and his 
wife, (wherein the debtor claimed an exemption as entirety 
property), as "personalty without instruments of title". (Id, 
491), and concluded that the personal property in question was 
not of the kind or nature usually capable of being held by the 
entirety, because the property right to such property was not, 
in some manner, embodied in a document, (Id, 492) and hence, 
that one of the "unities" required for a tenancy by the 
entireties, that of unity of interest, was missing. Since the 
property was not of the nature that could be held in tenancy by 
the entirety, the court concluded that household goods and 
furnishings, jointly possessed and used by married persons in 
Wyoming, are held by the spouses as Tenants in Common. 
Of interest is the fact that even though denying Entireties 
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ownership, the Anselmi Court recognized that the spouse was at 
least a tenant in common of jointly used and possessed 
household goods. Indeedr it seems impossible to conclude that 
a woman would not have some ownership interest in the bed 
shared with her husband, even though it may have been for only 
a brief time. 
POINT III 
IP THE PERSONAL PROPERTY REFERRED TO AS THE R.C. 
WILLEY FURNITURE WAS PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE 
ESTATE, THEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN VALUED AS OF THE 
DATE OF DEATH, AND AS USED PROPERTY RATHER THAN AT 
THE FULL COST OF ITS PURCHASE AS NEW PROPERTY. 
The trial Court set the value of the R.C. Willey furniture 
(which consisted of a bedroom setf refrigerator, and two 
chairs) at $2,558.00 and held them to be a part of the probate 
estate. (R 173f 15). The District Court further found that 
these items were purchased on November 20, 1985, some ten days 
before the decedents death, for a cost of $2,558.00. (R 173, 
13) 
It is axiomatic that for probate purposes, the property of 
an estate is valued as of the date of death. There is no 
evidence that this property could have been returned to the 
seller for full credit of purchase price, and in fact, the 
surviving spouse testified that the property was used furniture 
and that R.C. Willeys would not have taken it back. (TR: pg 68, 
In 13-16)* Even though purchased only 10 days prior to the 
decedents death, and delivered only a few day prior to 
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decedents death, the testimony is uncontroverted that the 
property was used furniture at the time of decedents death. 
Clearly, it was error for the court to value it at its full 
cost of purchase as new property. 
O.C.A. §75-3-705, provides that the inventory of 
"... [Plroperty owned by the decedent at the time of his death 
be listed with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each 
listed item its fair market value as of the date of decedents 
death,..." (emphasis added) Likewise, O.C.A. §75-3-707, 
further provides that for supplementary inventory or 
appraisement, the property be listed "... [Slhowing the market 
value as of the date of the decedents death...", (emphasis 
added) 
Appellant maintains that the District Court incorrectly 
characterized the property in question as new, when it was in 
fact used, and incorrectly set the value of the property at its 
full cost of purchase ten days prior to the decedents death. 
Appellant further maintains that the value of the property 
should be established as set forth in the Personal 
Representatives Reply to Objection to inventory which was filed 
with the court and which is a part of the record of this 
appeal, wherein the Personal Representative estimated the fair 
market value of the refrigerator and two chairs to be no more 
than $400.00 and the value of the bedroom furniture as used 
property to be no more than $300.00. (R 154). In the absence 
of an appraisal, which the Respondent and objecting party had 
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every opportunity to obtain. Appellant maintains that the fair 
market value estimated by the owner of the property and by the 
Personal Representative who was in possession of the property 
is conclusive as to value. Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. 
Marshall, 557 P.2d 352, 16 Wash. App. 503. 
In the alternative, Appellant requests that the issue of 
valuation of the furniture as used property be remanded for 
hearing. 
POINT IV 
THE VALUE OF OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL PROPERTY 
OF THE ESTATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET AT ITS APPRAISED 
VALUE. 
The Inventory filed by the Personal Representative in this 
matter included 23 items of miscellaneous used furniture which 
had been owned by decedent for some time and in which the 
surviving spouse claimed no ownership interest. (R 116-117). 
The Personal Representative caused to have the property 
appraised by the owner of a used furniture company who 
appraised each item separately at a total value of $85.35. The 
name and address of the appraisor was indicated on the 
inventory with the items appraised as required by U.C.A. 
S75-3-706. A copy of the appraisal was attached to the 
Inventory as Exhibit A. (R 119-120) 
The Respondent daughter of the decedent filed Verified 
Objections to the Inventoryr but did not object to the 
appraisal of this property. (R 124-126) The Respondent did not 
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object to the value placed on the inventory, but instead 
objected to the claim filed by the Personal Representative for 
payment of storage expenses on this property. In fact, the 
Respondent acknowledged the value of the property in question 
to be equal to $85.35, (R 127, 17) the amount of the 
appraisal.) Respondents Objection was not to the value of the 
property, but to the payment of storage costs which nearly 
equalled the value of the property. 
The Respondent testified at the hearing that she had 
previously objected to the value placed on the property. (TR: 
pg. 31 In. 19-21) However, the question she was answering was 
obviously misleading and confusing. (TR: pg 31-33) In her 
Verified Objections, she did not object to the value placed on 
the property, but in fact, acquiesced in the valuation set 
forth in the Inventory. (R 127, 17) She further testified that 
she did not obtain an independent appraisal of the property. 
(TR: pg 31, In 25). 
Her objection was to the storage costs, not the valuation 
of the property. She did not object to valuation, and in fact, 
stipulated to the appraised value (TR: pg 33, In 4-8) (R 127, 
17). 
Appellant submits that Respondent cannot have it both ways. 
Note however that in the Personal Representatives Reply to 
Objection it was pointed out that this property was stored at 
the request of Respondent who had indicated a desire to claim 
it and that the Personal Representative had actually suggested 
in writing that Sharon Beers take possession of this property 
in order to avoid the storage cost of approximately $30.00 per 
month. (R 159-160) 
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She cannot object to the Estate storage costs on the grounds 
that it is disproportionate to the value of the property, make 
no objection at that time to the valuation of the property, 
make no effort to obtain an independent appraisal, and then be 
deemed to have made a valid objection to the valuation itself. 
In fact, Respondent did not intend to object to the value, but 
the District Court merely misconstrued her objection. 
The Court, in its ruling and on its own Motion, ordered 
that the property be appraised by a specific individual from a 
specific company in Ogden, Utah. (TR: pg 96; R: pg 3, 16) The 
District Court was reminded that an appraisal had been done and 
that there was no objection to that appraisal. (TR: pg 99, In 
24; pg 100, In 25) Still, the District Court, sua sponte, 
ordered that the property be appraised a second time, and by a 
specific named individual. 
Appellant maintains that this ruling contradicts the spirit 
and purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code as set forth in 
U.C.A. §75-3-705 and -706, and constitutes an abuse of the 
Courtfs discretion. The Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-705 
reads as follows: (Full text provided at Addendum A-7). 
"This and the following sections eliminate the 
practice now required by many probate statutes 
under which the judge is involved in the selection 
of appraisers. If the Personal Representative 
breaches his duty concerning the inventory, he may 
be removed. §75-3-611...The alternative procedure 
is to file the inventory with the court ...The 
court's role in respect to the second alternative 
is simply to receive and file the inventory with 
the file relating to the estate." 
A * new appraisal was obtained from the specific individual 
26 
designated by the court. The new appraisal was $135.00. (R 
184). 
The Court did not explainf and gave no indication of the 
need for this second appraisal. Was the objection directed 
toward the individual who performed the first appraisal? If so, 
is there a list of appraisers who are not acceptable to Court? 
If this is the case, due process would seem to require that 
this list be made public so that personal representatives do 
not waste their time and the funds of the estate in obtaining 
appraisals from persons who are not acceptable to the Court. 
If, on the other hand, only certain appraisers, or if only 
one appraisor is qualified to so act before the Court, then 
again, fundamental due process and common sense would seem to 
require that this fact be stated in the Rules of Practice of 
the Court so that all parties may be informed thereof. 
In the absence of an assertion of bad faith, Appellant 
maintains that it was a clear abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to order a new appraisal from a specific named 
individual in the face of an apparently valid appraisal, no 
genuine objection thereto, and acquiescence therein by all 
interested parties. Walters v. Schmeer, 422 P.2d 676, 245 Or. 
477 (1967). 
Appellant recognizes that the District Court has discretion 
to appoint expert witnesses of its own selection and on its own 
motion. (Rule 706(a) O.R.E.) However, the plain language of 
this Rule requires the court, whether acting on its own motion 
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or on the motion of any party, to enter an Order to Show Cause 
why expert witnesses should not be appointed* The Rule further 
allows either party to show cause why expert witnesses should 
not be appointed. Clearly this is an instance where no 
additional expert testimony could be justified. 
Additionally, Rule 706(a) U.R.E. provides for the 
deposition of any expert witness named pursuant to the Rule and 
specifically provides that he shall be subject to 
cross-examination by each party. Rule 706(a) U.R.E. will not 
support the District Court's Ruling in this case which, in 
effect, set the value of the property at the amount determined 
by this specific appraiser in the absence of any opportunity to 
cross-examine, to present other evidence, or even the minimum 
procedural opportunity to object to the need therefore as 
specifically required by the Rule. 
Clearly, the Courts ruling in this regard constitutes plain 
error, and is an abuse of the Courts discretion. 
POINT V 
FUNDS OBTAINED FROM THE MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNTS OF 
THE DECEASED FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE 
ESTATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A PART OF THE ESTATE. 
U#C.A# §75-6-107 specifically provides that "Sums recovered by 
the Personal Representative [from multiple-party accounts of 
the deceased] shall be administered as part of the Decedents 
Estate." In this case, only the family allowance was paid over 
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to the Personal Representative to be administered as part of 
the Estate. Despite demands and requests by the Personal 
Representative for payment of funds to pay funeral expenses of 
the deceased and costs of his last illness, as well as other 
expenses of the Estate, no payments other than the family 
allowances mentioned above were paid over* Application was 
made to the court in the form of an Order to Show Cause, (R 
75-79), but the court refused to rule on the issue, and instead 
directed that the entire matter be set for trial of all issues. 
(R 84-86). 
Appellant does not claim that either the Estate or the 
Personal Representative suffered any monitary loss as a result 
of the funds not being administered as part of the Estate. 
Instead the failure of the Court to enforce the relevant 
provisions of the statute in this regard complicated the 
Probate and had the potential of damaging the Personal 
Representatives credit and reputation with the various 
creditors of the Estate. (TR: pg 92, In 19-25) (R 156-158) 
For example, several claims contained notations to the 
Respondent, Sharon Beers, and her phone number, but did not 
contain either the Personal Representatives name and number or 
that of her attorney. (R 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144) This is 
the case even though the attorney for the Estate had an 
employee contact the claimants on numerous occasions. 
(Testimony of Brandon Nelson, TR: pg 77, In 8-16) (R 157-158) 
At the time of the final hearing on this matter, April 10, 
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1987, some 17 months after decedent's death, the fune*ral 
expenses and some of the medical expenses of the deceased had 
still not been paid. (R 174, 18) while the Personal 
Representative and surviving spouse was carried as the creditor 
on most of these statements, thereby potentially damaging her 
credit. (Plaintiffs Exhibit E) 
In addition, there was considerable confusion as to who was 
responsible for the bills and even as to the amount of the 
bills. (Compare-TR: pg 26 & 27; with TR: pg 62, In 21-25 & pg 
63 In 1-18). Appellant submits that this confusion was 
primarily the result of the creditors now knowing with whom 
they were dealing or who was responsible for payment. (R 
156-158) Appellant further submits that the Personal 
Representative always had the responsibility to pay these bills 
and that the creditors were entitled to look to the Personal 
Representative for satisfaction of their claims (U.C.A. 
§75-3-701, et seq.), irrespective of the fact that the funds to 
pay these claims might or would come from the multiple-party 
accounts of the deceased and the Respondent. (D.C.A. §75-6-107) 
If this Court orders additional payments from the 
multiple-party accounts of the deceased as a result of this 
appeal, in the interest of future Personal Representatives who 
may be faced with this dilemma, Appellant urges this Court to 
rule that U.C.A. §75-6-107 means exactly what it says, that, 
"Sums recovered by the Personal Representative [from the 
multiple-party accounts of the deceased] shall be administered 
by the decedents estate11. 
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POINT VI 
AMOUNTS ORDERED TO BE PAID TO THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNTS OF 
THE DECEASED SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED AN AWARD OF 
INTEREST. 
The final payments to the personal Representative from the 
multiple-party accounts of the deceased were made June 5, 1987, 
some 18 months after decedents death. The sums on deposit in 
the multiple party accounts were presumably earning interest 
during this time inasmuch as the Court had ruled they not be 
withdrawn except to pay family allowance and debts of the 
estate. (R 73). 
It is unjust for the Respondent to profit by sums left on 
deposit during the pendency of these proceedings. Equity seems 
to require that payments eventually made from these accounts 
include an award of interest equal to the interest being earned 
on the money. 
Interest is generally allowed for claims against an estate, 
and generally at the legal rate. U.C.A. §75-3-806(4). (See 
also Comments to Model Probate Code §3-806(d) • A In this 
instance, however, interest equal to whatever the funds earned 
while on deposit seems more just and equitable and further 
removes the question of fault or blame for the delay. 
Essentially, this is a claim for interest on a theory of 
quantum meriut. 
General support for this approach is found in the case of 
In re: Listman's Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac 596 wherein the 
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court held that, "...Illnterest was not chargeable as a matter 
of course against an executor, but may be so charged if the 
circumstances of the particular case require it." In that 
case, an executor failed to invest in bonds as directed by the 
court and was held chargeable with interest lost as a result of 
this failure to invest. The award was not meant as a penalty 
so much as a requirement to do equity in the circumstances of 
that case* 
Appellant's request for an award of interest is not 
intended to be punitive in any way. Nor would it be so. It is 
merely an attempt to do equity. Otherwise, the Respondent will 
have been unjustly enriched in the form of interest earned on 
money actually belonging to other parties during the pendency 
of these proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests the following Rulings of this Court. 
I That the spouse's exempt property claim is a "statutory 
allowance" as that term is used in U*C.A. §75-6-107, and that 
the multiple party accounts of the deceased are available to 
satisfy any deficiency in exempt property claimed pursuant to 
S75-2-402. 
II That the personal property referred to as the R*C. Willey 
furniture was held jointly by the decedent and the surviving 
spouse, either as Tenants in the Entirity, which would make the 
surviving spouse the sole owner free of Probate; or, 
alternatively, that the surviving spouse was a Tenant in Common 
with respect to the property and that after Decedents death, 
she was a one-half owner of the property, jointly with, the 
Estate* 
III If the R.C* Willey furniture is held to be a part of the 
Estate, that it should have been valued as of the date of death 
and as used property rather than at the full cost of its 
purchase as new property* 
IV That the District Court abused its discretion in ordering a 
new appraisal of personal property of the Estate referred to as 
the "other miscellaneous property", and that the value of the 
33 
property is as set forth in the first appraisal submitted with 
the Inventory. 
V. That sums which were recovered from the multiple-party 
accounts of the Deceased pursuant to U.C.A. §75-6-107 should 
have been administered as part of the Decedent's Estate, and 
not paid directly to claimants by the other multiple-party 
account holder* 
VI. That payments ordered to be paid to the Personal 
Representative from the multiple-party accounts of the deceased 
should have included an award of interest under a theory of 
Quantum Meriut* and that the case be remanded for determination 
of the appropriate award of interest. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Estate of: : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
ALLAN HAMILTON WAGLEY, : 
P r o b a t e No . 3364 
D e c e a s e d . : 
The P e t i t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of d e c e d e n t f o r 
A l l o w a n c e o f C l a i m s , A p p r o v a l o f S u m m a r y o f A c c o u n t a n d 
D i s t r i b u t i o n , I n v e n t o r y , a n d M o t i o n f o r O r d e r o f P a y m e n t f r o m 
J o i n t A c c o u n t s of D e c e d e n t and t h e V e r i f i e d O b j e c t i o n s of S h a r o n 
B e e r s c a m e on f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t 
p u r s u a n t t o S t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s on F r i d a y , A p r i l 10 , 1987 , 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e R o d n e y S. P a g e , D i s t r i c t J u d g e , a t t h e 
c o u r t h o u s e i n F a r m i n g t o n , U t a h , a n d ' D a n i e l L. W i l s o n , E s q . 
a p p e a r i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d t h e 
e s t a t e , and M i c h a e l L. Deamer , E s q . a p p e a r i n g on b e h a l f o f S h a r o n 
B e e r s , and t h e C o u r t h a v i n g r e c e i v e d t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e and 
being fully advised in the premises, now therefore, hereby 
enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
!• The decedent Allan Hamilton Wagley and the personal 
representative Susan Wagley were married on November 25, 1985, 
and decedent died on November 30, 1985. 
2. Prior to decedent's marriage to the personal 
representative, decedent established two joint accounts, one at 
Valley Bank and one at Davis County Bank in the sum of $8,000 and 
$10,000 respectively in January of 1985, with the name of Mrs. 
Sharon Beers, decedent's daughter, being added to those accounts 
in April of 1985. Decedent indicated at that time that it was 
his desire that Mrs. Sharon Beers receive those funds upon his 
death that were placed in joint tenancy. 
3. Prior to decedent's marriage to the personal representa-
tive, furniture and fixtures were purchased from RC Willey on 
November 20, 1985f consisting of chairs, a refrigerator, a bed-
room set, etc., for a cost of $2,558. 
4* Prior to decedent's marriage to the personal 
representative, decedent made a gift of a Wurlitzer organ to his 
grandson, Ronald Beers, and delivered said organ to his daughter 
Sharon Beers and as such the organ is not part of the probate 
estate* 
5. The furniture and fixtures referred to in Paragraph 3 
above have a value of $2,558 and are part of the probate estate. 
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6 . C e r t a i n m i s c e l l a n e o u s f u r n i t u r e and f i x t u r e s owned by 
d e c e d e n t p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e a r e p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e and 
i t w o u l d b e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e e s t a t e t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y 
b e a p p r a i s e d by H i l l s F u r n i t u r e i n Ogden and s o l d t o g e t h e r w i t h 
t h e f i s h t a n k . 
I. The $250 S o c i a l S e c u r i t y d e a t h b e n e f i t and t h e f i s h t ank 
h a v i n g a v a l u e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $150 a r e a s s e t s of t h e p r o b a t e 
e s t a t e . 
8 . The unpa id c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e a r e $10 t o Tanne r ' s 
C l i n i c , $13.40 t o M e r c h a n t ' s C r e d i t , $18 t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , 
a n d a n a d d i t i o n a l c l a i m of $ 4 5 2 , 0 4 t o L i n g u i s t and S o n ' s 
M o r t u a r y , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e $1,911.05 which had been p r e v i o u s l y 
p a i d by S h a r o n B e e r s and t h e $ 1 , 2 0 0 p r e v i o u s l y p a i d by t h e 
e s t a t e . 
9 . A d d i t i o n a l v a l i d c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e a r e $542 for 
o p e n i n g and c l o s i n g t h e g r a v e p a i d from t h e p e r s o n a l funds of 
M r s . S h a r o n B e e r s a s w e l l a s t h e sum of $50 p a i d on t h e V i s a 
a c c o u n t . T h e r e i s a l s o a v a l i d c l a i m f o r $136 f l o w e r e x p e n s e s 
p a i d by t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and $78 i n s t o r a g e e x p e n s e s . 
10 . T h e r e i s a v a l i d c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e f o r $1 ,800 
f o r f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e . 
I I . P o r t i o n s of t h e m i s c e l l a n e o u s f u r n i t u r e and f i x t u r e s 
a f t e r a p p r a i s a l by H i l l s F u r n i t u r e of Ogden may be p u r c h a s e d by 
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Mrs. Sharon Beers at the appraised price if Mrs. Beers so 
desires. 
12. The funds existing in the joint accounts are not part 
of the estate property for the purpose of the exempt property 
claim of the widow. Said funds should not be considered to 
augment the estate under the statute. 
13. To the extent there is property with value in the 
estate, the widow is entitled to a claim of exempt property up to 
$3,500. 
14. There is an additional claim against the estate for $50 
form the personal representative for filing fees. 
15. The insurance proceeds of $2,006 and $229 are not part 
of the estate. 
16. It is in the best interest of the estate that to the 
extent the property is insufficient to pay the claims listed 
above, the sums and proceeds in the joint accounts may be applied 
for that purpose and credit shall be given for those sums which 
have already been paid. 
17. It is in the best interest of the estate that the 
attorney's fees and personal representative fees with adjustments 
to reflect the change in values be approved and paid. 
18. It would be in the best interest of the estate that 
funds paid by Mrs. Beers from her own accounts are to be reim-
bursed to her from the property of the estate and thereafter from 
the joint accounts. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The j o i n t bank a c c o u n t s a t V a l l e y Bank and a t D a v i s 
C o u n t y Bank i n t h e sum of $8 ,000 and $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 p a s s t o Mrs . S h a r o n 
B e e r s a s a s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t by o p e r a t i o n of law and a r e n o t 
p r o p e r t y of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e . 
2 . The W u r l i t z e r o r g a n was g i f t e d by d e c e d e n t t o h i s 
g r a n d s o n and s a i d organ i s no t p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e . 
3 . The c l a i m s r e f e r r e d t o above a r e v a l i d c l a i m s a g a i n s t 
t h e e s t a t e a n d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e e s t a t e p r o p e r t y i s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o pay t h o s e c l a i m s , payment s h a l l be made from t h e 
j o i n t a c c o u n t s of d e c e d e n t and Mrs . S h a r o n B e e r s . C r e d i t s h a l l 
be g i v e n fo r sums a l r e a d y p a i d . 
4 . D e c e d e n t ' s widow, Mrs . Susan Wag ley , may c l a i m exempt 
p r o p e r t y up t o $ 3 , 5 0 0 i n p r o p e r t y of t h e e s t a t e a s d e f i n e d 
h e r e i n . P roceeds of t h e j o i n t banking a c c o u n t s w i t h Mrs. Sharon 
B e e r s a r e no t s u b j e c t t o t h e $3,500 exempt p r o p e r t y c l a i m of t h e 
widow. 
5 . The i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s of $ 2 , 0 0 6 and $229 r e c e i v e d by 
t h e widow a r e n o t p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e o r s u b j e c t t o t h e 
exempt p r o p e r t y c l a i m of t h e widow. 
6. The f e e s of t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in t h e amount of 
$372 .16 and t h e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i n t h e amount of $520.27 a r e 
app roved and s h a l l be p a i d from t h e j o i n t a c c o u n t s t o t h e e x t e n t 
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that the property of the estate is not sufficient to pay those 
f ees« 
7. The Summary of Account and Distribution, the Petition 
for Allowance of Claims, Order Allowing Claims and Inventory as 
modified above should be approved. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Inventory, Summary of Account and Distribution, Petition for 
Allowance of Claims and Order Allowing Claims as modified above 
be and the same are hereby approved and the Motion for Order of 
Payment from Joint Accounts of Decedent except as set forth above 
be and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the administration of the 
estate be closed and the property be distributed to the parties 
as their respective interest may appear. 
DATED this ^ " d day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
TO FORM: 
f/A''/^ 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 1
 -k.toMU 
DANIEL L. WILSON 
6PG29 
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75-3-705. Duty of personal representative—Inventory and appraise-
ment.—Within three months after his appointment, a personal repre-
sentative, who is not a special administrator or a successor to another 
representative who has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare 
an inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of his 
death, listing it with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each 
listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent's 
death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist 
with reference to any item. The personal representative shall send a 
copy of the inventory to interested persons who request it. He may also 
file the original of the inventory with the court. 
History: C 1953, 75-3-705, enacted cerning the assets of the estate need 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; L. 1977, ch. 194, 
§34. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1977 amendment deleted "and 
file or mail" before "an inventory of 
property"; and rewrote the concluding 
portion of the section which formerly 
read: "to interested persons who request 
it, or he may file the original of the 
inventory with the court." 
The corresponding section In the offi-
cial text of the Code is numbered 3-706. 
Editorial Board Comment 
This and the following sections elimi-
nate the practice now required by many 
probate statutes under which the judge 
is involved in the selection of appraisers. 
If the personal representative breaches 
his duty concerning the inventory, he 
may be removed. Section 75-3-611. Or, 
an interested person seeking to surcharge 
a personal representative for losses in-
curred as a result of his administration 
might be able to take advantage of any 
breach of duty concerning inventory. The 
section provides two ways in which a 
personal representative may handle an 
inventory. If the personal representative 
elects to send copies to all interested per-
sons who request it, information con-
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Effect of failure to comply with law. property belonging to estate.Jn re Robi-
Letters of administration could be re-
voked for failure to inventory certain 
not become a part of the records of the 
probate court. The alternative procedure 
is to file the inventory with the court. 
This procedure would be indicated in 
estates with large numbers of interested 
persons, where the burden of sending 
copies to all would be substantial. The 
court's role in respect to the second al-
ternative is simply to receive and file 
the inventory with the file relating to 
the estate. See section 75-3-204, wnich 
permits any interested person to demand 
notice of any document relating to an 
estate which may be filed with the court. 
Collateral References. 
Executors and AdministratoTs^=J62-73. 
33 C.J.S. Executors and Administra-
tors §§ 129-140. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 114, Executors and 
Administrators § 209. 
Dilatoriness of executor or administra-
tor in filing inventory, or making re-
ports, as ground for removal, 72 A. L. R. 
956. 
Surchargeability of trustee, executor, 
administrator or guardian in respect of 
mortgage investment, as affected by mat-
ters relating to value of property, 117 
A.L.R.B71. 
son's Estate, 59 if. 431, 204 P. 321. 
U.C-A- §75-3-705 and 
Editorial Board Comment 
A-7 
75-6-107. Rights of creditors.—No multiple-party account will be 
effective against an estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor 
sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, includ-
ing statutory allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children and 
dependent children, if other assets of the estate are insufficient. A sur-
viving party, P.O.D. payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from a 
multiple-party account after the death of a deceased party shall be liable 
to account to his personal representative for amounts the decedent owned 
beneficially immediately before his death to the extent necessary to dis-
charge the claims and charges mentioned above remaining unpaid after 
application of the decedent's estate. No proceeding to assert this liability 
shall be commenced unless the personal representative has received a 
written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one acting for a 
minor or dependent child of the decedent; and no proceeding shall be 
commenced later than two years following the death of the decedent. 
Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be administered as 
part of the decedent's estate. This section shall not affect the right of a 
financial institution to make payment on multiple-party accounts accord-
ing to the terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a deceased 
party unless before payment the institution has been served with process 
in a proceeding by the personal representative. 
History. C. 1953, 75-6-107, enacted by multiple-party account if the probate 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. estate is insolvent; rights are limited, 
_ , , . . . . _ , - . however, to sums needed for statutory 
Editorial Board Comment. allowances. The phrase "statutory al-
The sections of this chapter authorize lowances" includes the homestead al-
transfers at death which reduce the lowance under section 75-2-401, the 
estate to which the surviving spouse, family allowance under section 75-2-403, 
creditors and minor children normally and any allowance needed to make up 
must look for protection against a dece- the deficiency in exempt property under 
dent's gifts by will. Accordingly, it section 75-2-402. In any case (including 
seemed desirable to provide a remedy to a solvent estate) the surviving spouse 
these classes of persons which should could proceed under section 75-2-201 et 
assure them that multiple-party accounts seq. to claim an elective share in the 
cannot be used to reduce the essential account if the deposits by the decedent 
protection they would be entitled to if satisfy the requirements of section 75-
such accounts were deemed a special 2-202 so that the account falls within the 
form of specific devise. Under this sec- augmented net estate concept. In the 
tion a surviving spouse is automatically latter situation the spouse is not pro-
assured of some protection against a ceeding as a creditor under this section. 
U.C.A. §75-6-107 and 
Editorial Board Comment 
A-8 
Section 6-107. [Rights of Creditors.] 
No multiple-party account will be effective against an 
estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor sums 
needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administra-
tion, including statutory allowances to the surviving 
spouse, minor children and dependent children, if other 
assets of the estate are insufficient. A surviving party, 
P.O.D. payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from 
a multiple-party account after the death of a deceased 
party shall be liable to account to his personal represen-
tative for amounts the decedent owned beneficially im-
mediately before his death to the extent necessary to 
discharge the claims and charges mentioned above re-
maining unpaid after application of the decedent's es-
tate. No proceeding to assert this liability shall be com-
menced unless the personal representative has received 
a written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor or 
one acting for a minor or dependent child of the dece-
dent, and no proceeding shall be commenced later than 
two years following the death of the decedent. Sums re-
covered by the personal representative shall be admi:r > 
tered as part of the decedent's estate. This section shall 
not affect the right of a financial institution to ma^e 
payment on multiple-party accounts according to the 
terms thereof, or make it liable to the estate of a deceased 
party unless before payment the institution has been 
served with process in a proceeding by the personal rep-
resentative. 
COMMENT 
The sections of this Article 
authorize transfers at death that 
reduce the estate to which the 
surviving spouse, creditors, and 
minor children normally must 
look for protection against a de-
cedent's gifts by will. It seemed 
desirable, therefore, to provide a 
remedy to these classes of persons 
that should assure them that 
multiple-party accounts cannot 
be used to reduce the essential 
protection they would be enti-
tled to if such accounts were 
deemed a special form of specific 
devise. Under this section, a sur-
viving spouse is automatically as-
sured of some protection against 
a multiple-party account if the 
probate estate is insolvent; rights 
are limited, however, to sums 
needed for statutory allowances. 
The phrase "statutory allow-
ances" includes the homestead 
allowance under Section 2-401, 
the family allowance under Sec-
tion 2-403, and any allowance 
needed to make up the deficiency 
in exempt property under Sec-
tion 2-402. In any case (includ-
ing a solvent estate), the surviv-
ing spouse could proceed under 
Section 2-201 et seq. to claim an 
elective share in the account if 
the deposits by the decedent sat-
isfy the requirements of Section 
2-202, so that the account falls 
within the augmented net estate 
concept. In the latter situation, 
the spouse is not proceeding as 
a creditor under this section. 
Model Uniform Probate Code 
§6-107 & Official Comment 
75-3-806. Allowance of claims.— 
(4) Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court 
entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear interest 
at the legal rate for the period commencing 60 days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired unless based on a con-
tract making a provision for interest, in which case they bear interest 
in accordance with that provision. 
U .C-A. § 7 5 - 3 - 8 0 6 ( 4 ) 
4. Interest on Allowed Claims 
Allowed claims accrue interest at the legal rate beginning 60 days 
after the time for original presentation of the claim. Presumably, the 
legal rate is that provided by statute. When the allowed claim is based 
on a contract that provides for interest, the allowed claim accrues inter-
est as stated in the contract. Allowed claims resulting from a judgment 
in another court accrue interest at the rate stated in the judgment. 
(Section 3-806(d)) 
Official Comment to 
Model Uniform Probate Code 
§3-806(d) 
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